Excuse me? So what you’re saying is that the aircraft manual can be written in any which way and can deliberately omit information about critical systems on board? A dubious agreement at best; even if one decides to put that systems recovery procedure on an emergency checklist but omits any information about relevant…
merlyn11a
merlyn11a
Agreed. Why couldn’t the man do more? Maybe if some particular folks actually tried to help him as opposed to be obstructionist at every step. And call that obstruction being anti-socialist when it was just protecting supremacist entitlement.
Actually, for me, the highlight is getting to see some of the brilliant people who work for NASA. That Lewis gets to play with some of that gear is nice. The title is clickbait though.
They did but much of it was based on a traditional conservative engineering approach balanced against statistical risk management (ie : no wag going on) aka ‘making your own luck’. IIRC, NASA used a bit of a higher safety margin than the USAF did. They did a huge amount of testing to failure to protect the program.…
Well, it did take a helluva lot of brass ones to do it. But those guys were pretty damn smart and driven all round. Aldrin himself tested and proved his personal orbital rendezvous concepts on Gemini 12 with its primitive onboard computer which basically was an 39 bit IBM Federal system with 13 bit syllabyles (!). 4K…
My interpretation was more like, ‘there’s these daft chavs out there, why? Their ideas are really full of cack, please explain their tiresome codswallop.’
Pre-order “bonuses” are a trick to get your head exactly where they want you. Once you get on the pre-order track, you’ve been psyched into Needing to buy that game. If you don’t like the industry because they figure to maximize their marketing efficiency, remember that part of the reason for pre-ordering is that…
True, but you could say that even in the ‘60s, the heyday of hydraulics when everyone was subject to the laws of plumbing. Have you tried flying an aircraft dependent on high pressure fluid dynamics when there’s no fluid? There’s no control at all. Or even back in the “good old golden days” of flight when it was all…
That is exactly the problem. The MCAS wasn’t even in the manual, neither the Pilots Manual nor, apparently, the FCOM for the plane itself. Some airlines weren’t even told about it. Southwest and American Airlines pilots learned about it in a roundabout fashion. The only saving grace is that, again apparently, they…
This is a reminder that while automation & computer systems are increasingly being relied upon by the aerospace industry, humans should make the final decision on how the airplane should be flown.
I’ve seen this as well. And, unfortunately, specifically, in an aerospace environment. There is definitely that trend in aerospace design where design failure/safety acceptance is being pared down. One account relayed to me basically laid out the desire by some to reduce a typical safety factor of 1.5 all the way down…
You know, this reminds me a little of the famous F-105 Thunderchief aka ‘Thud’. It was a huge plane for a single pilot (later 2 aircrew when the AF decided they needed a -F trainer which became a -G Wild Weasel); at 64' plus long, it was almost 2 F-86 Sabres end to end. Anyways, because of it’s great length and…
Yup. Kind of sad though.
They do. It’s SOP. In this case, though, you have crews who were used to flying standard 737 or 737 NG models. The Max differ in physical design and performance which Boeing neglected to inform the airlines and pilots of. A critical failure, right there.
It’ll be interesting to see the FDR data set. The plane was travelling fast and one wonders if the FBW spoiler system had any involvement.
Yeah, saw that too which confirmed some of my suspicions about LionAir and the strange aspects of the maintenance issues before the final flight. The fact that LionAir 610s previous flight had serious inflight issues which were “resolved” around replacing an AoA sensor didn’t really explain everything. The AoA sensor…
Actually, the Max and all planes allow the human to make the final decision. Unfortunately, in these 2 cases, the humans didn’t have the training or knowledge to make the correct decision. And the manufacturer made it exceedingly difficult to do so based on economic reasons as opposed to safety reasons.
The MCAS a terrible design for sure. Might have been mitigated as a standalone (1 vane and 1 vane only) if :
Maybe ‘lostinspace’ was thinking of something like the ‘deathcaps’ in California. We always have a few people die or get super-ill after every wet year because all the fungi just come out of every where. Many people from Asia mistake them for ‘white caesars’ native to SEA, consume them and die or have to have liver…