idk how about the jsf?

firstly the safe comparison is a perfect precedent. law enforcement doesn’t hire safe manufacturers to break into their own safes, they hire safe crackers or locksmiths. similarly the FBI as all the legal right in the world to hire whichever hackers they want to get the data for them or to develop their own in-house…

That is not all what I’m saying. the evidence is not the safe but the contents of the safe. by destroying the safe to gain access to the contents as a locksmith would no one’s rights are violated. on the contrary forcing the safe manufacturer to manufacture a universal key so safes don’t need to be destroyed is a…

here is a more thorough summary of silicon device tamper resistance or as it points out the complete inability to prevent motivated individuals with physical access to a key storage chip from discovering the key given time and resources (such as those available to the FBI)

I will simply ignore your terrible attitude and say that as the paper i have linked mentions there are numerous invasive techniques that can be used to recover data from semiconductor devices. That is precisely the issue here. The FBI could spend the time and the money to develop these forensic techniques in house but…

They are driven by two very different outlooks on information security though so yeah at the FBI they essentially are.

no company with an IT department composed of more than one person hands out phones to its employees without tying them to some type of domain system they have control of. The county’s poor IT policies are beyond apple’s ability or duty to control. if they had such systems in place the whole “its a government owned…

it protects the owner of the data from non owners. your healthcare data from hackers, your cat pictures from the government. same exact thing

because the fbi isn’t actually requesting the bare minimum to gain access to the data. i will try to explain using an analogy.

physical destruction of a safe reveals its contents and similarly physical destruction could be used to reveal the data on this phone. The FBI isn’t looking for help disassembling the phone to get to the data they are looking for a universal key to all phones so they don’t have to get apple’s help every time they want…

this is like being asked to a make a universal key and being told not to worry because the FBI will keep the universal key behind a locked door. It is extremely dangerous even if the FBI is composed entirely of good people because even one breach of that locked door unlocks every door ever and requires new locks…

Revealing the causes of vulnerabilities and being forced to create new ones are on two very different levels. Apple routinely reveals the causes of vulnerabilities in its software. Similarly if a vulnerability in vehicle PCMs existed that allowed such control we would expect the manufacturer to reveal how it was…

They are not preventing them. The owners gave control of the device to a third party. It is neither apple’s concern nor responsibility what a customer does with the product they sell them.

Because physical destruction of a safe already is capable of revealing it’s contents which means no one needs to hire the safe makers to make a master key to defeat their own safe. Thus safe makers are never asked to compromise their own products.

You clearly have an extremely limited understanding of the implications of creating tools that allow anyone to break security on electronic devices. Its all fun and games while the only thing we are looking for is some terrorist’s contact list but what happens when these tools and techniques that were developed for…